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ABSTRACT
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See how today's achievement is only tomorrow's confusion 1

INTRODUCTION

In late August of 2004, Google went public. 2 By late September of 2005, Google's
co-founders, Sergey Brin and Larry Page, were billionaires. 3 A large portion of this
fortune derived from Google's AdWords campaign. 4 Google is a popular search
engine that, similar to all search engines, finds specific websites when a computer
user enters words or phrases into a search query.5 The search engine then creates a
list of the corresponding websites by providing links to each website with
descriptions that a computer user "must sort in order to find what he or she is
looking for." 6 AdWords is a service created by Google that allows advertisers to
purchase words that force their websites to appear under "sponsored links" when
specific keywords are typed into Google's search engine. 7 Frequently, advertisers not

*J.D. Candidate, May 2007, The John Marshall Law School. B.A. English (hon.) and Religious
Studies, University of Iowa, 2000. I would like to thank my parents and Tricia for always being

there; Karen Mitch and Kristina Walker for their editorial patience, attention to detail, and support
during the process; the RIPL editorial board for all of their assistance; attorney John A. Cullis for
shining a light on this topic; and the library staff of Chicago-based firm Neal Gerber & Eisenberg for
teaching me the value of comprehensive research.
I William Dean Howells, Pordenone, IV reprinted in John Bartlett, Familiar Quotations:A
Collection of Passages, Phrases and Proverbs Traced to their Sources in Ancient and Modern
Literature 1,631 (Emily Morison Beck ed., 1980).
2 See Editorial, Google Goes Public, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 20, 2004, at Al (stating that Google's
initial public offering occurred on August 19, 2004).
3 See Bijlionaires' Club, L.A. TIMES, Sept. 23, 2005, at C1 (noting that both Sergey Brin and
Larry Page, the co-creators of the Google search engine, each have a net worth of $11 billion dollars).
4 Gary Rivlin, It's Maybe a Bubble, but a Selective One, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 3, 2005, at C1 (noting
Google's advertisement revenue was up 122 percent from the previous year's fourth quarter, due in
large part to the AdWords program).
5 See Novak v. Overture , 309 F. Supp. 2d 446, 450 (E.D. N.Y. 2004) The Eastern District of
New York defined a search engine as a device used to find internet websites relating to a specific
topic. See Id. To use a search engine "a user must enter a text inquiry into the program" and the
search engine will "attempt to match the intent of the user's text query with the actual content of
the web pages found on the net." Id. The court goes on to reference Google.com as examples of
search engines. Id.
6 Sporty's Farm, LLC v. Sportsman's Mkt., Inc., 202 F.3d 489, 493 (2nd Cir. 2000).
7 Google v. Am. Blind & Wallpaper Factory, Inc., No. C 03-05340-JF, 2005 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
6228, at *6 (N.D. Cal. Mar. 30, 2005); See also Google AdWords, https://adwords.google.com/select/
(last visited Oct. 10, 2005). Google's AdWords program is available to anyone wishing to purchase
keywords that will trigger his advertisement to pop up when the keywords are entered into Google's
search engine. Id.
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only purchase words associated with their products and services, but also purchase
words associated with their competitor's products and services.8 For example, when
"Goodyear Tires" is typed in, the first link appearing under the sponsored links is
BFGoodrich Tires, a direct competitor to Goodyear. 9 Further, when the advertiser
attempts to purchase a generic word, for example "tires," Google also suggests
purchasing the words "Goodyear Tires" and "Volvo Tires." 10 This practice is of
understandable concern to businesses looking to protect their trademarked interests
and, in the current age of e-commerce, raises questions of trademark infringement
that are still unresolved.1 1
The trademark legality of AdWords is currently being litigated in Google v.
American Blind.12 American Blind claims Google's AdWords program earns money
by allowing competitors to purchase American Blind's trademarks. 13 These marks
are subsequently being used by American Blind's competitors in an attempt to lure
customers to their websites.1 4 However, it would be difficult to find Google liable for
traditional direct trademark infringement because the Lanham Act, the federal act
governing trademarks, 15 requires that a search engine, like Google, "use[sJ"
American Blind's marks "in commerce." 16 Under the traditional view of direct
trademark infringement, a "use in commerce" means direct public use of a trademark
by a competitor. 17 This means that Google would incur liability if a search engine
user, after typing "American Blind" into the search engine, associates the companies
that appear under "sponsored links" with Google's services.18 On the other hand,

8 See Am. Blind, 2005 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 6228, at *6. American Blind alleges that through
Google's AdWords campaign, its competitors purchased keywords that, in whole or part, utilized
American Blind trademarks. Id.
9 http://www.google.com/search?hl=en&lr=Goodyear+Tires&btnG=Search
(last visited Sept.
25, 2005).
10 Google Keyword Tool, https://adwords.google.com/select/KeywordToolExternal (last visited
Apr. 1, 2006) (enter "Goodyear Tires" and scan keyword's suggestions).
I See Am. Blind, at *3-*4. Of particular concern is the fear that potential consumers that
would have purchased a company's product are being led to competitors because those competitors
purchased words associated with their brand in Google's AdWords campaign. See id.
12Id. at *13.
13Id. at *6.
14 Id.
at *7-*8.
15 Black's Law Dictionary 896 (8th ed. 2001). The Lanham Act is "[a] federal trademark
statute, enacted in 1946, that provides for a national system of trademark registration and protects
the owner of a federally registered mark against the use of similar marks if any confusion might
result .... " Id. The definition goes on further to state that the Lanham Act defines the scope of
federal trademark law. See id
16 See 15 U.S.C. § 1127 (2000). "The term 'use in commerce' means the bona fide use of a mark
in the ordinary course of trade." Id.
17See 15 U.S.C. § 1114(1)(b) (2000) (finding reproduction of "labels, signs, prints, packages,
wrappers, receptacles or advertisements intended to be used in commerce" are trigging events that
enable the remedy provision for trademark infringement).
18 See Interactive Prods. Corp. v. a2z Mobile Office Solutions, Inc., 326 F.3d 687, 695 (6th Cir.
2003) (holding that the question of "use" in a trademark case focuses on whether the infringing
party is using the mark in a way that identifies the source of his goods or services); see also,
Qualitex Co. v. Jacobson Prods. Co., 514 U.S. 159, 163-64 (1995) (finding that the basic objective of
trademark law is to prevent competitors from copying a source-identifying trademark and using it in
association with their goods, reaping an unjust reward based on the reputation of the trademark
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allowing a liberal reading of "use in commerce" to include search engine liability
could lead to hazardous repercussions in non-internet related trademark law. 19
This comment proposes that current trademark law should not liberally
construe the "use" requirement to apply to search engines. Instead, Congress should
create a specific exception within the Lanham Act to remedy the situation.
This comment begins with a background section that is a chronology of the
evolution of trademark law actions pertaining to the internet. Second, there is an
analysis of the conflicts courts must resolve under the current state of internet
trademark law. In particular, courts are faced with three options: 1) refuse to
expand traditional trademark law 20 and deny companies, similar to American Blind,
trademark remedy against search engines like Google, 2) expand trademark to a
level that would expose search engines to direct trademark infringement, 21 or 3)
advocate that Congress make a specific amendment to the Lanham Act concerning
search engines. Third, the proposal suggests a congressional creation of a search
engine exception to the Lanham Act. Due to the creation of the anti-cybersquatting
23
22
amendment to the Lanham Act and current state and pending federal legislation
arising from pop-up advertisement cases, advocacy to Congress to create an exception
is not only a sound option, but a viable one.

I. THE DEVELOPMENT OF TRADEMARK LAW ON THE INTERNET
Trademark law has long required that a successful claim for infringement
proves: "1) [the party] possesses a mark, 2) that the defendant used the mark, 3) that
the defendant's use of the mark occurred 'in commerce,' 4) that the defendant used
the mark 'in connection with the sale, offering for sale, distribution or advertising' of
goods or services, and 5) that the defendant used the mark in a manner likely to
confuse consumers." 24 As internet trademark law has developed, most of the debate

holder).
19Soo Stacey L. Doogan & Mark A. Lemley, Trademark in Transition: Institute for Intellectual
Property& Information Law Symposium." Trademarks and Consumer Search Costs on the Internet,
41 HOUS. L. REV. 777, 809-10 (2004) (pointing out that if "use" was broadly construed in trademark
infringement to the point that selling a mark as a keyword is illegal, previously protected uses, like
newspapers using trademarked terms in headlines, writers of movies and books using trademarked
goods in their stories, and even gas stations or restaurants locating across the street from their
competitor and capitalizing off of the attention grabbing sign, might be liable for trademark
infringement based on the new definition).
20 See Wells Fargo & Co. v. WhenU.com, Inc., 293 F. Supp. 2d 734, 762 (E.D. Mich. 2003)
(upholding a strict interpretation of "use" in a pop-up scenario)
21 See Playboy Enters., Inc. v. Netscape Commc'ns. Corp., 354 F.3d 1020, 1024 (9th Cir. 2004)
(upholding a liberal interpretation of "use" in a search engine scenario).
22 See generally Utah Code Ann. § 13-40-101 (2000) (dealing with pop-up legislation and is
popularly known as the "Spyware Control Act"); 15 U.S.C. § 1125(d).
23 See H.R. REP. NO. 108-619, at 2 (2004), availableat http://thomas.loc.gov/cgi-bin/cpquery/
R?cp108:FLD010:@l(hr619). This report concerns proposed federal legislation (H.R. 2929) about
pop-ups and is popularly known as the "Securely Protect Yourself Against Cyber Trespass Act" or
the "Spy Act." Id.
24 U-Haul Int'l, Inc. v. WhenU.com, Inc., 279 F. Supp. 2d 723, 727 (E.D. Mich. 2003).
See
generally 15 U.S.C. § 1114 (2000).
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occurs over the "use in commerce" and "likelihood of confusion" elements. 25 However,
within these two elements there is no consensus amongst courts as to what element
is considered the "core" element. 26 This section begins with a discussion regarding
how these elements have been applied to pre-Anti-cybersquatting Act, in domain
name and pop-up advertisement/spyware cases, and culminates with a discussion of
current search engine cases.

A. Domain Name Disputes
Domain name cases were some of the first cases in which online trademark
infringement actions were asserted. 27 In these cases, the typical issue was private
citizens buying corporate domain names, such as "McDonalds.com," with hopes of
capitalizing off the McDonald's brand or by reselling the website back to
McDonald's. 28 Because the use of the mark was the actual domain name, courts
tended to focus more on the "likelihood of confusion" element than the "use in
29
commerce" element.

25 Brookfield Commc'ns, Inc. v. W. Coast Entm't Corp., 174 F.3d 1036, 1053 (9th Cir. 1999)
(stating that "use" is "half the battle" and one "must also show that the public is likely to be
somehow confused about the source or sponsorship"); Plybuy, 354 F.3d at 1024 (explaining that
after "use" is set forth, a "likelihood of confusion" must be shown). Contra Interactive Prods. Corp.
v. a2z Mobile Office Solutions, Inc., 326 F.3d 687, 695 (6th Cir. 2003) (holding that "use in
commerce" is a preliminary/threshold question to be determined).
26 See U-Haul Int'l, 279 F. Supp. 2d at 729. Perhaps giving an explanation as to why courts
stress different elements, the Eastern District of Michigan found that since there was no "use" of the
trademark under the Lanham Act, and use was a threshold issue, U-Haul's trademark infringement
claim failed and no discussion of the "likelihood of confusion" was necessary. Id. Compare Wells
Fargo, 293 F. Supp. 2d at 757-69 (discussing in depth that court devoted a large amount of
discussion to the issue of "use" and only briefly addressed the "likelihood of confusion" element),
with Playboy, 354 F.3d at 1024 (claiming that the core element of trademark infringement is the
"likelihood of confusion" and only spending a brief amount of discussion on "use"), and Wells Fargo,
293 F. Supp. 2d at 764-69 (devoting significant analysis as to the merits of the "likelihood of
confusion" element after already finding Wells Fargo failed on the "use" requirement).
27 See generallyGateway 2000, Inc. v. Gateway.com, Inc., No. 5:96CV1021, 1997 WL 33165847,
at *3 (E.D.N.C. Feb. 6, 1997); Planned Parenthood Fed'n of Am. v. Bucci, No. 97 Civ. 0629, 1997 WL
133313, at *2 (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 24, 1997). Compare Brookfield Commcns, 174 F.3d at 1036 (reaching
its final disposition as a cybersquatting case in 1999), with U-Haul, 279 F. Supp. 2d at 723 (reaching
its final disposition as a pop-up case in 2003), and Google v. Am. Blind & Wallpaper Factory, Inc.,
No. C03-05340-JF, 2005 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 6228, at *1 (reaching a preliminary ruling in a search
engine case in 2005).
28

See David Nelmark,

Virtual Property: The

Challenges of Regulating Intangible,

Exclusionary Property Interests Such as Domain Names, 3 NW. J. TECH. & INTELL. PROP. 1, 9
(2004). Nelmark reasons that the purchase of the McDonald's domain name was valuable because
the domain name holder could sell his own products or services when the consumer entered the
already-established McDonald's name as a hyperlink. Id. The purchase could be additionally
beneficial because the domain name holder could offer to sell the domain name to McDonalds at a
much higher cost than its purchase price. Id.
29 See Quokka Sports, Inc. v. Cup Int'l. LTD., 99 F. Supp. 2d. 1105, 1114-15 (N.D. Cal. 1999)
(devoting no time to "use," the Northern District of California found quickly that Quokka had an
enforceable right in the mark and then immediately focused its attention on the "likelihood of
confusion" element); see also CCBN.com, Inc. v. C-Call.com, Inc., 73 F. Supp. 2d. 106, 109-14 (D.
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Two of the earliest reported domain name dispute cases, Intermatie v. Toeppen
and Panvision v. Toeppen, demonstrate how courts attempted to understand the
internet while trying to apply trademark theory. 30 Both cases involve Dennis
Toeppen, an entrepreneur who registered approximately 240 domain names of well31
known businesses.
In Intermatie, the Northern District of Illinois affirmed a magistrate judge's
refusal to grant summary judgment on behalf of Intermatic. 32 Intermatic claimed
that Toeppen, by purchasing www.intermatic.com, infringed on intermatic's
trademark, INTERMATIC. 33 To get an idea how new the internet was in a legal
context, the magistrate judge's decision started with the exclamation "Welcome to
cyberspace!" 34 Instead of going into a "use" analysis, the Intermatie court applied the
Seventh Circuit's seven factor "likelihood of confusion" test.35 The court concluded
that summary judgment was improper because, among other things, there was no
evidence that Toeppen associated his services with Intermatics's services and the
36
issue before the court was an untested area of law that Toeppen was "free to test."
The companion case, Panavision, was decided by the Central District of
California. Similar to Intermatic, Panavision was a summary judgment motion
against Dennis Toeppen. 37 However, instead of trademark infringement, Panavision
38
argued a cause of action under Federal and California trademark dilution laws.
Additionally, unlike Intermatic, the Panavision court found Toeppen liable for
dilution because Toeppen "prevented Panavision from using its marks in a new and
important business medium."

39

While Panaviion, a dilution case, did not argue

direct trademark infringement or "likelihood of confusion," direct trademark
infringement cases began to develop where courts ruled in favor of companies on the
40
"likelihood of confusion" element.
This is evidenced in Brookfield Communications, Inc. v. West Coast
Entertainment Corp., where the plaintiff attempted to purchase "moviebuff.com" and
discovered West Coast, the defendant, already purchased the domain name. 41 In
addition, there was evidence that West Coast intended to launch a website

Mass., 1999) (addressing the "likelihood of confusion" as the major factor and limiting the "use"
discussion to determine who had senior rights to the mark).
3'0 Intermatic Inc. v. Toeppen, 947 F. Supp. 1227, 1228-29 (N.D. I1. 1996); Panavision Int'l v.
Toeppen, 945 F. Supp. 1296, 1300 (C.D. Cal. 1996).
'l Intermati, 947 F. Supp. at 1230.
'32 Id. at 1236.
3 Id. at 1233.
"3 Id. at 1229.
3 Id. at 1234-35.
36 Id. at 1236.
37 Panavision Int'l v. Toeppen, 945 F. Supp. 1296, 1300-01 (C.D. Cal. 1996).
38 Id. at 1298.
3 )d.
at 1304.
40 See, e.g., Brookfield Commc'ns, Inc. v. W. Coast Entm't Corp., 174 F.3d 1036, 1057 (9th Cir.
1999).
41 Id. at 1042; see also Colby B. Springer, Comment, Master of the Domain (Name):A History
of Domain Name Legislation and the Emergence of the Anti-eybersquatting Consumer Protection
Act and Uniform Dispute Resolution Policy, 17 SANTA CLARA COMPUTER & HIGH TECH. L.J. 315, 327
(2001) (explaining that the West Coast Entertainment not only took Brookfield's desired domain
name, but was using it for the same reason Brookfield desired to use it).
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containing a searchable entertainment database similar to the plaintiffs database. 42
Focusing on "likelihood of confusion," the Ninth Circuit proclaimed that even when
consumers immediately realize they have arrived at West Coast's movie database
rather than Brookfield's, West Coast gained the initial interest through use of
Brookfield's trademark. 43 This doctrine is commonly referred to as "initial interest
44
confusion."
If the Intermatie court applied Brookfield's definition of initial interest
confusion, it would have had a better chance of the Northern District of Illinois
granting summary judgment. This is because Intermatic, a software marketing
company, could argue that when users typed "www.intermatic.com," they thought
they were going to Intermatic's website. 45 To add to the computer user's confusion,
Toeppen also sold software on the website. 46 However, though the facts in Intermatie
and Brookfie]d fit neatly into initial interest confusion, other cases created problems
for the courts. 47 Occasionally, courts found "use" of the mark in the domain name,
but the party "using" that mark provided such a dissimilar service and product there
may not be initial interest confusion. 48 These findings vexed courts because often the
domain name seemed to be purchased in bad faith; yet, with no confusion, there could
be no trademark infringement. 49 Due to the prevalence of this practice, courts began
' 50
calling it "cybersquatting. "

Bruook eld COmmbns., 174 F.3d at 1042.
Id.. at 1057.
44 See Eric Goldman, De-regulatingRelevaney In Internet Trademark Law, 54 EMORY L.J. 507,
560-61 (2005) (arguing that Brookfield modified the theory of internal interest confusion from
requiring credibility transference to "merely requir[ing] searcher 'diversion."'); see also Doogan &
Lemley, supra note 19, at 815-16. Initial interest confusion was a pre-Brookfield doctrine that
addressed the notion that confusion can occur at times other than the point of sale; but, Brookffeld
used the concept of initial interest confusion to prove actual likelihood of confusion. Id. at 814-15.
Courts continue to rely on Brookfield and still find that initial interest confusion can be substituted
for actual confusion. Td. at 816-817; see Promatek Indus., Ltd. v. Equitrac Corp., 300 F.3d 808, 812
(7th Cir. 2002) (finding initial interest confusion without finding actual confusion).
45 See Intermatic Inc. v. Toeppen, 947 F. Supp. 1227, 1236 (N.D. Ill. 1996) (arguing that
Toeppen's "use of the 'intermatic.com'domain name in and of itself would cause confusion" but not
bringing up the concept of initial interest confusion).
46 Id. at 1232.
47 See Sporty's Farm, LLC v. Sportsman's Mkt., Inc., No. 3:96CV0756, 1998 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
23290, at "12-*13 (D. Conn. Mar. 13, 1998) (finding that there was not a direct "likelihood of
confusion" because Sporty's Farm was in the business of selling Christmas trees during the holiday
season while Sportsman's Market was in the business of having a mail order business catalogue
year round); Giacalone v. Network Solutions, Inc., No. C-96 20434, 1996 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 20807, at
*2 (N.D. Cal. June 14, 1996) (granting a preliminary injunction even though both companies offered
somewhat similar services); see also Sally M. Abel, Trademark I7ssues in Cyberspaee: The Brave
New Frontier,5 MICH. TELECOMM. & TECH. L. REV. 91, 104 (1999) (claiming that, in Giacalone, the
Northern District of California prevented a toy manufacturer from interfering with Giacalone's right
to use the disputed website because he offered web consulting services even though Giacalone's site
analogized web software to children's toys).
48 See Sporty'sFarm,1998 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 23290, at *12-'13.
49 See id.
50See Nelmark, supranote 28, at 10. During a the trial in the Northern District of Illinois, the
court defined a cybersquater as "an individual who attempts to profit from the Internet by reserving
and later reselling or licensing domain names back to the companies that spent millions of dollars
developing the goodwill of the trademark." Id. Apparently, the judge had a large degree of
42
43
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Recognizing the dilemma of the courts, Congress created a separate provision in
51
the Lanham Act focusing on the bad faith intent of the domain name purchaser.
On November 29, 1999, Congress passed the Anti-Cybersquatting Protection Act
creating a clear remedy for domain name disputes. 52 However, the courts were not
finished with internet-related trademark issues and soon began considering a second
line of cases that concerned downloaded programs that created pop-up
53
advertisements on an internet user's computer.

B. Pop-Up/Spyware Cases
Pop-up advertisements are advertisements that appear on an internet user's
screen without the user's consent. 54 They have become commonplace on the internet
and have resulted in a lucrative business for programs that are able to block pop-up
windows. 55 These programs block the "triggering device" that causes advertisements
to appear on the user's screen. 56 Most computer users, however, do not understand
that some pop-up windows are triggered by programs installed on their personal
computers, oftentimes buried in the fine print of download agreements. 57 This is
exactly the type of program WhenU, an internet advertising company, used and, as a
result, became a defendant in three high profile pop-up cases. 58 WhenU allowed
animosity towards this particular defendant and was a big factor in the use of the term,
"cybersquatter." See id.
51 See Lanham Act § 43, 15 U.S.C. § 1125(d)(1)(A)(i) (2000). A person is liable under the
provision if he "has a bad faith intent to profit from that mark, including a personal name which is
protected as a mark under this section." Id. This might significantly change a ruling in a case like
Giacalone,in which the website used an analogy to the toy manufacturer. See Giacalone, 1996 U.S.
Dist. LEXIS 20807, at *2. Additionally, the CiberPiracy prevention provision helped to remedy
jurisdictional problems. Lanham Act § 43, 15 U.S.C. § 1125(d)(2)(A). The Act allows a person filing
a domain name suit to do so as an in rem action against the domain name itself, causing the
jurisdiction to occur in the district of the domain name registrar. Id.
52 See Lanham Act § 43, 15 U.S.C. § 1125(d)(1).
53 See, e.g., U-Haul Int'l, Inc. v. WhenU.com, Inc., 279 F. Supp. 2d 723, 725-26 (E.D. Va. 2003).
54 See Jonathan Bick, Trademark Law Shapes InternetPop-Up Ads: Trademark Infringement
Actions May Get InternetAdvertisers to Change their Business Methods, 180 N.J. L.J. 1017, 1017
(2005) (stating that pop-up ads appear "on an internet user's computer, while the Internet user surfs
the Internet," and that these pop-ups "are normally generated by the host Web site without the
user's consent").
55 See Brad Stone, Those Annoying Ads that Won't Go Away, Newsweek, Oct. 14, 2002, at 38
(finding that pop-up advertisements are "obnoxious" and noting how there is growing consumer
backlash against them); see also Shelley Emling, Intrusive Ads Popping Up Less? Companies Start
to Pull Plug on TV, Phone, Online Advertising as Consumers get Fed Up, The Austin Am.Statesman, Nov. 3, 2002, at Ji (noting that consumers are consistently complaining about pop-up
advertisements and pointing out that the company X1O Wireless Technology Inc., from January
through July 2002, launched 1 billion pop-up advertisements).
56 Business, Earthlink KO's Pop-ups to punch up marketing, Boardwatch Magazine, Nov. 1,
2002, at 8. See Randall Stress, St. Google Slays Pop-Up Dragon, INT'L HERALD TRIBUNE, Nov. 22,
2005, at Finance 3 (praising Google for setting up a "multilateral disarmament" of pop-up
advertisers by not allowing them on their website).
57 See U-Haul Int'l, 279 F. Supp. 2d at 724-25 (finding that pop-up advertisement software is
downloaded to a person's computer when he downloads free programs, such as screensavers and
games, from the internet).
5S 1-800 Contacts, Inc v. Whenu.com, 309 F. Supp. 2d 467, 476 (S.D.N.Y. 2003), rev'd, 414 F.3d
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internet users to download "free" screensavers in return for accepting software
containing an adware/spyware program that caused pop-ups. 59 This program used a
directory "of commonly used search phrases, commonly visited web addresses, and
various keyword algorithms" to determine whether a computer should receive a popup advertisement. 60 For example, when a consumer entered the domain name
"www.1800contacts.com" in an attempt to purchase eye-care products, the WhenU
program recognized the domain name and triggered pop-up advertisements for other
61
eye-care companies as well.
Unlike domain name cases where courts focused on "likelihood of confusion",
most courts in pop-up cases focused on the word "use" in the Lanham Act and
whether a liberal or strict reading applied. 62 To complicate things further, it is
unclear whether courts interpreting the Act opted for a liberal interpretation of "use"
or simply confused trademark "use" with the concept of "use in commerce" to invoke
63
federal jurisdiction on trademark issues.
The initial cases involving WhenU, U-Haul v. WhenU and Wells Fargo v.
WhenU, reached similar results on the determination of "use." 64 These cases strictly
interpreted "use" within the Lanham Act to mean an actual public use of the
400 (2nd Cir. 2005) (arguing that Whenu.com used the 1-800 Contacts domain name to trigger direct
competitors advertisements); U-Haul Intl, 279 F. Supp. 2d at 723 (arguing that, similar to 1800
Contacts, its trademarks were being illegally used); Wells Fargo & Co. v. WhenU.com, Inc., 293
F. Supp. 2d 734, 757 (E.D. Mich. 2003) (pursing trademark infringement).
59 1-800 Contacts, Inc. v. WhenU.com, Inc, 414 F.3d 400, at 404 (2nd Cir. 2005); U-Haul Intl,
279 F. Supp. 2d at 726; Wells Fargo, 293 F. Supp. 2d at 739. 1-800 Contacts, U-Haul Int'l, and
Wells Fargo all involve WhenU.com's software that a user accepts through a license agreement
when downloading various free internet software. 1-800 Contacts, 414 F.3d at 404; U-Haul Intl,
279 F. Supp. 2d at 726; Wells Fargo,293 F. Supp. 2d at 739.
6o U-Haul Int, 279 F. Supp. 2d at 725-26.
61 See 1-800 Contacts, 309 F. Supp. 3d at 476. The similarity between WhenU's software and
Google's AdWords product are similar. Compare 1-800 Contacts, 414 F.3d at 404, with Google v.
Am. Blind & Wallpaper Factory, Inc., No. C 03-05340-JF, 2005 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 6228, at *5-*6
(N.D. Cal. Mar. 30, 2005). Both systems use trademarked terms to generate advertisements.
Compare 1-800 Contacts, 309 F. Supp. 3d at 476, with Am. Blind,2005 U.S. Dist. LEXIS, at *5-*6.
62 See Wells Fargo, 293 F. Supp. 2d at 757-58 (holding that even though defendant "used"
plaintiffs website in its adware to trigger pop-ups, it is not trademark "use" because the plaintiffs
trademark was not seen by the consumer/computer user). But see 1-800 Contacts, 309 F. Supp. 3d
at 489 (finding that a search engine that contains the URL for plaintiffs website that triggers
competitors pop-up ads was capitalizing on the goodwill of plaintiff with the use of its product);
GEICO v. Google, No. 1:04cv507, 2005 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 18642, at *11 (E.D. Va. Aug. 8, 2005)
(finding, in a search engine context, that defendant "used" plaintiffs marks and rejecting defendant's
argument that the marks were used only in defendant's computer coding and was not seen by the
consumer/computer user).
6 Compare Brief of Amicus Curiae Google Inc. Supporting Neither Appellants Nor Appellee
But Supporting Reversal at 4-5, 1-800 Contacts, Inc v. Whenu.com, 414 F.3d 400 (2nd Cir. 2005)
(No. 04-0026-cv) 2004 WL 546932 (arguing that the 1-800 Contacts court went beyond a liberal
reading and erroneously confused the concepts of "use" to invoke jurisdiction and "use" to satisfy the
'use" element of a trademark action), with 15 U.S.C. § 1127 (2000) (defining "use in commerce" as
"the bona fide use of a mark in the ordinary course of trade, and not made merely to reserve a right
in a mark").
64 See U-Haul Intl, 279 F. Supp. 2d at 728 (finding that public use can only be shown when
infringers use a trademark to generate business/interest in their product by identifying their
products with the trademark they are infringing upon); see also Wells Fargo,293 F. Supp. 2d at 747
(holding that use is actual public use).
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trademark. 65 The U-Haul court found that "use" could only be shown if U-Haul could
prove that WhenU used U-Haul's marks in the pop-ups and associated them with
WhenU's advertising services. 66 The problem was that advertisements for WhenU
never appeared in the pop-up windows; only advertisers that paid WhenU to have
their names in the WhenU program registry would appear. 67 Because WhenU's popup windows were separate and distinct from the trademark protected website and
the use of the trademarked URL as an ad trigger was not seen by the consumer, nor
promoted by WhenU's software, the Eastern District of Virginia concluded there was
68
no "use" under the Act.
In Wells Fargo, the Eastern District of Michigan similarly concluded WhenU's
pop-up advertisements did not constitute "use" because WhenU simply used the
trademark to "identify the website itself, just like one would have to use the word
69
'Macy's' to describe the Macy's department store."
The first two WhenU cases made clear that the courts would not extend the
requirement of "use in commerce" to pop-up software providers.70 However, the third
case in the series, 1-800 Contacts v. WhenU, initially found differently.7 1 The
District Court of New York disagreed with the Eastern Districts of Michigan and
Virginia, finding there was "use" in two separate ways. First, the court found that
WhenU's program, which caused competitors' pop-up advertisements to appear when
internet users specifically attempted to access another website, provided services
"rendered in commerce." 72 Second, the inclusion of the exact trademark, 1-800

6 See U-Haul Int, 279 F. Supp. 2d at 728 (finding that public use can only be shown when
infringers use a trademark to generate business/interest in their product by identifying their
products with the trademark they are infringing upon); see also Wells Fargo,293 F. Supp. 2d at 747
(holding that use is actual public use).
66 U-Haul Intl, 279 F. Supp. 2d at 728. The court did not mention that "use" could not be
shown in the pop-up context per se, but found that U-Haul provided insufficient evidence to prove
trademark use. Soo id.
67 Id.
68 See id. at 725. The court additionally found that while the SaveNow program may have
caused inconvenience, but it did not hinder users from accessing U-Haul's website in a trademark
'use" type of way. Id.
69 Wells Fargo, 293 F. Supp. 2d at 762. The Eastern District of Michigan additionally
distinguished the "metatag" cases by not only claiming there was a use of the metatag but that there
was also an additional use by the companies to rise to the level of "use." Id. at 763. These additional
uses are comparable to domain name disputes because defendants also use domain name to
establish their website in addition to the metatags. See id.
70 U-Haul Intl, 279 F. Supp. 2d at 728; see Wells Fargo,293 F. Supp. 2d at 762.; U-Haul Intl,
279 F. Supp. 2d at 728.
71 Compare Wolls Fargo,293 F. Supp. 2d at 762 (finding that WhenU's "use" had to be actual
use of Wells Fargo's marks), and U-Haul Intl, 279 F. Supp. 2d at 728 (finding that the "use"
requirement was not fulfilled), with 1-800 Contacts, Inc. v. WhenUcom, 309 F. Supp. 2d 467, 489
(2003) (holding that not only did "WhenU" "use" the mark, it did so in such a way that constituted a
"use in commerce"). The Southern District of New York did not accept WhenUs arguments that: 1)
WhenU's advertising pop-ups occurred in separate windows; consequently, the pop-ups and the 1800 Contacts website would be visible at the same time creating no likelihood of confusion; and 2)
'nothing is more fundamental" in trademark infringement "use" than showing that WhenU not only
used the 1-800 Contacts marks, but used the marks in such a way that a consumer would associate
WhenU with 1-800 Contacts goods. 1-800 Contacts,309 F. Supp. 2d at 488.
72 1-800 Contacts, 309 F. Supp. 2d at 489. The court supported this conclusion by reasoning
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CONTACTS, in the adware was "use" by WhenU. 73 The court either liberally read
"trademark use" or confused it with the "use in commerce' jurisdictional
74
requirement.
The District Court of New York's decision in 1-800 Contacts allowed American
Blind to survive Google's motion to dismiss in Google v. American Blind.75 However,
for American Blind to be ultimately successful in its trademark infringement claim
against Google, American Blind must establish that AdWords's suggestion that
competitors
purchase American Blind's marks rises to the level of direct trademark
"use." 76 The District Court of New York was helpful because its finding that the
inclusion of a trademarked term in WhenU's software was direct "use" can be easily
analogized with Google's act of suggesting/allowing trademarked terms to be
purchased in its AdWords program. Regardless whether the District Court of New
York's liberal construction of "use" was confused with the "use in commerce" federal
jurisdictional requirement, American Blind relied on that construction to overcome
77
Google's motion to dismiss.
Shortly after American Blind survived Google's motion to dismiss, the 1-800
Contactscase was overturned on appeal to the Second Circuit.78 The Second Circuit
believed there was no "use in commerce" within trademark law and ultimately
deferred to the strict interpretation of "use in commerce" by the Wells Fargo and UHaul courts. 79 Google submitted an amicus brief supporting reversal of the District
Court's interpretation of "use."8 0 The Second Circuit seemingly agreed with Google
that when computer users with WhenU's software attempted to access the 1-800 Contacts website
and the software triggered pop-up advertisements for direct competitors, it was based off of the
goodwill from the 1-800 Contacts brand. Id.
7'3
Id.
74 Doogan & Lemley, supra note 19, at 805. Doogan and Lemley argue that the traditional
interpretation of public trademark "use" by the courts is that the Lanham Act prohibits only" use of
the [trade]mark to brand or advertise the defendant's services or to suggest an affiliation with the
plaintiff." Id. They further claim that the 1-800 Contacts court either erred or wrongly expanded
the doctrine because no matter how much WhenU used 1-800 Contacts's marks they did not "use" 1800 Contacts's mark in a way to associate the mark with WhenU. Id. This is ultimately evidenced
by the fact that when a computer user types in the 1-800 Contacts mark, WhenU's SaveNow
software generates pop-ups of 1-800 Contacts's competitors, not advertisements for WhenU itself.
See id. But see, Sarah J. Givan, Using Trademarks as Location Tools on the Internet." Use in
Commerce?, 2005 UCLA J.L. & TECH. 4,
6 (2005) (arguing that the liberal interpretation of "use"
does not go against trademark law nor is it wrongly reasoned because the pop-up windows are used
in such a way that could cause a likelihood of confusion).
7" Google v. Am. Blind & Wallpaper Factory, Inc., No. C 03-05340, 2005 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 6228,
at *22, *41 (N.D. Cal. Mar. 30, 2005).
76See id.
77 See id.(stating "[h]owever, in light of the uncertain state of the law [i.e. the 1-800 Contacts
and Playboy decisions], the court does not find the Defendants' arguments sufficient to warrant
dismissal of American Blind's counterclaims and third-party claims at the pleading stage").
78 1-800 Contacts, Inc. v. WhenU.com, 414 F.3d 400, 413 (2nd Cir. 2005). The Second Circuit
remanded the Southern District of New York's decision that WhenU "used" the marks according to
the definition of "use" in the Lanham Act and remanded the case with instructions to "dismiss with
prejudice 1-800's trademark infringement claims against WhenU." Id.
79 Id. at 408. The Second Circuit maintained that even though 1-800 Contacts believed it was
not bound by the U-Haul and Wells Fargo decisions, the "thorough analyses" by both courts on the
same issue at hand was "persuasive and compelling." Id.
80 Brief of Amicus Curiae Google Inc. Supporting Neither Appellants Nor Appellee But
Supporting Reversal at 4-5, 1-800 Contacts, Inc v. Whenu.com, 414 F.3d 400 (2nd Cir. 2005) (No.

[5:431 2006]

Internet Search Engine Liability

that the District Court of New York confused the federal jurisdiction requirement of
"commercial use" with the separate and distinct trademark infringement
81
requirement that the infringing party "use" another's mark "in commerce."
The WhenU case trilogy is not the only line of cases against pop-up windows and
adware. In Sotelo v. Directrevenue,a computer user sued an adware company on a
claim of trespass to chattels and survived a motion to dismiss. 8 2 In addition, there is
pending legislation in the federal government and enacted legislation in Utah
specifically targeting "spyware," though neither is related to trademark law.8 3 The
pop-up cases raise issues such as whether trademark law is the best avenue for
remedy, whether tort actions or other areas of current law, besides trademark, are a
better fit, and whether legislation is necessary to remedy the problem. These
84
questions are similar to the issues raised by recent search engine litigation.

C. Search Engine Cases
Two cases that discuss a search engine's liability for trademark infringement
are Playboy v. Netscape and GEICO v. Google.8 5 In Playboy, a search provider had a
04-0026-cv) 2004 WL 546932. Google argued that the Southern District of New York's decision
appeared to be a misinterpretation of "use." Id. Google argued that the court confused "use in
commerce," which creates minimum contacts and enables Federal diversity jurisdiction, with "use,"
an element of trademark infringement that requires a showing that WhenU used 1-800 Contact's
trademark to associate the mark with WhenU's goods or services. Id.
81 Compare id. at *5 (2nd Cir Feb. 18, 2004) (stating, very similar to the way the second circuit
later ruled that it found the U-Haul and Wells Fargo cases controlling, that the District Court's
ruling on "use" placed the law in "direct conflict with the only two other cases to consider trademark
liability for pop-up ads; with 1-800 Contacts, 414 F.3d at 408 (finding "the thorough analyses set
forth in both UHauland Wells Fargoto be persuasive and compelling").
82 Sotelo v. Directrevenue LLC, 384 F. Supp. 2d 1219, 1230-33 (N.D. Ill. 2005). The Northern
District of Illinois found that even though trespass to personal property had been "largely relegated
to a historical note in legal textbooks," it was still a valid cause of action and had enough legal
weight to withstand a motion to dismiss. Id. at 1230. The court went on to say that trespass to
chattels has a viable application to spyware programs because the prima facie elements of trespass
to chattels, which are interference and damage, equally apply in an internet context. See id.
83 See generally Utah Code Ann. § 13-40-101 (2000). The statute states that a person cannot
"display a pop-up advertisement" through a spyware program if the advertisement is triggered "in
response to a specific mark" or "in response to a specific internet website address" regardless of
whether it is trademark infringement. Utah Code Ann. § 13-40-201(1)-(1)(c) (2000). See Securely
Protect Yourself Against Cyber Trespass Act, H.R. 2929, 109th Cong. § 3 (2005) (containing
proposed legislation seeking to require more stringent notice requirements when a computer user
downloads a program that contains spyware). Most recently, this bill was approved by the House by
a vote of 3934. The Library of Congress Thomas Bill Summary of H.R. 29, http://thomas.loc.gov/cgibin/bdquery/z?d109:H.R.29:@@@L&summ2=m& (last visited Mar. 31, 2006).
84 See Goldman, supra note 44, at 588-89 (arguing there should not be attempts to make
search providers liable for trademark infringement based on keyword usage where domain name
registrars, essentially doing the same thing, have long enjoyed protection from trademark
infringement lawsuits).
85 Playboy Enters., Inc. v. Netscape Commc'ns. Corp, 354 F.3d 1020, 1022-23 (9th Cir. 2004)
(discussing the concept of "keying" in which advertisers linked advertisements to pre-identified
terms the computer user typed into the search engine); GEICO v. Google, Inc., 330 F. Supp. 2d 700,
701 (E.D. Va. 2004) (analyzing a case where GEICO accused Google of "using" GEICO's marks for
advertising purposes through Google's search engine).
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policy that required adult oriented companies to link their advertisements to
Playboy's trademarked terms "Playboy" and "Playmate."S6 Similar to Google v.
American Blind, when the search engine user typed in "playboy" or "playmate," ad
banners of other sites would appear.8 7 Playboy, as a result, filed a claim for
88
trademark infringement against Netscape.
The Ninth Circuit quickly dismissed the "use" issue under a liberal
interpretation of the statute.8 9 The court, instead, dedicated a majority of its
discussion to the issue of "likelihood of confusion."90 Applying the principles of initial
interest confusion established in Brookfied, the court concluded there was a genuine
issue of material fact as to a substantial likelihood of confusion. 91
Likewise, in GEICO, the Eastern District of Virginia liberally interpreted the
definition of "use."92 However, it is difficult to argue that the court confused the
interpretation of "use" with the Federal jurisdictional requirement because the court
distinguished that Google used both GEICO's trademarks "in commerce" and "in
connection with the sale, offering for sale, distribution, or advertising." 93 Similar to
Playboy, GEICO stressed that once "use" occurred there must be a finding of
"likelihood of confusion."94 To show "likelihood of confusion," GEICO introduced
surveys of internet users' confusion with the search engine-triggered advertisement,

86 Playboy, 554 F.3d at 1023. The Ninth Circuit found that Netscape actually required adult
oriented companies to link their advertisements to "Playboy" and "Playmate" so, when the keywords
were typed in by the computer user, those companies' banner ads appeared on the search results
page. Id.
87 Id.
88 Id. Playboy brought action against Netscape on the alternative theories of trademark
infringement and trademark dilution. Id. Procedurally, the Ninth Circuit first overturned the
District Court's denial of Playboy's request for a preliminary injunction and then overturned the
district court's subsequent granting of summary judgment in favor of Netscape. Id.
89 Id. at 1024 (finding that Netscape had "used" Playboy's marks in the span of a sentence and
focusing the rest of the argument on the "likelihood of confusion" element of trademark
infringement).
90 Id. The Ninth Circuit reasoned that the "core element" of a trademark infringement action
is the likelihood of confusion element and that element is the center of the Pinboyhcase. hd
91 Id.at 1026. The Playboy court relied on an eight-part test for determining initial interest
confusion that was established in an earlier case. Id. This test balances several factors, some of
which do not apply and others that weigh more heavily. Id. The test analyzes, among other things,
the "strength of the mark," the "evidence of actual confusion," and the "defendant's intent in
selecting the mark." Id. Additionally, the court suggested that the showing of actual confusion is
the most import of the factors. See id. Defendant's intent in possessing the mark is similar to the
intent/bad faith requirement in the Cyberpiracy prevention provision.
See 15 U.S.C.
§ 1125(d)(1)(A)(i) (2000).
92 GEICO v. Google, Inc., 330 F. Supp. 2d 700, 703 (E.D. Va. 2004). The Eastern District of
Virginia summarized the conflict in the law between the two definitions of the trademark "use"
element. Id. The court stated, "in 1-800 Contacts ... on facts identical to those found in U-Haul
and Wells Fargo cases" the Southern District of New York took the completely opposite position and
found that WhenU engaged in "trademark" use. Id. The court ultimately found that the
interpretation of trademark "use" by the 1-800 Contacts and Playboy courts was better and would
control the interpretation of "use" in the case at hand. Id.
9 Id.at 703-04. The Court reasoned that if they were to accept the facts alleged by GEICO as
true, GEICO would prevail on the "use in commerce" requirement. Id.
94 GEICO v. Google, Inc., No. 1:04cv507, 2005 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 18642, at *11-*12 (E.D. Va.
Aug. 8, 2005)
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which the court ultimately found unconvincing. 95
Google v. American Blind must be decided in the above context. The court faces
many difficult decisions such as how it will apply "use in commerce," whether it
believes trademark is an adequate form of remedy for American Blind's situation,
and whether it should rely on Congress to create a specifically tailored exception.

II. ANALYSIS
This section discusses three major questions that the American Blind court must
decide. First, this section compares and contrasts both the liberal and traditional
interpretations of the "use in commerce" element. Second, this section analyzes
whether the court should deny trademark infringement as an adequate avenue of
remedy for search engine actions or promote another area of law as a solution. Last,
taking into perspective the history of congressional legislation relating to online
intellectual property rights, there is an exploration of the viability of advocating
congressional creation of search engine specific legislation.

A. "Use in Commerce:"InherentProblems with a LiberalInterpretation?
The Playboy and GEICO decisions create difficulties for Google because, despite
Google's success in having the liberal interpretation of "use in commerce" overturned
by the Second Circuit in 1-800 Contacts,the more on-point Playboy and GEICO cases
seem to embrace the liberal view. 96 In Google's reply in support of a motion to
dismiss, Google argued that Playboy and Brookfield are inapposite. 97 Additionally,
Google asked that GEICO be limited to its specific facts. 98 However, if American
Blind succeeds in getting a liberal interpretation of "use," what does this mean for
trademark law as a whole?

95,

GEICO v. Google, Inc., No. 1:04cv507, 2005 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 18642, at "17-'26 (E.D. Va.

Aug. 8, 2005) (finding that GEICO's survey was weak and failed to demonstrate a "likelihood of
confusion' because the control group did not "demonstrate the source of the test group's confusion.").
96 Compare GEICO, 330 F. Supp. 2d at 704 (finding that Google's use of the trademark in its
adware program satisfies the "use in commerce" requirement), and Google v. Am. Blind & Wallpaper
Factory, No. C 03-05340, 2005 WL 832398, at *5 (N.D. Cal. Mar. 30, 2005) (finding that, under the
standard of a motion to dismiss, American Blind's argument that Google "used" its mark survived),
with Brief of Amicus Curiae Google Inc. Supporting Neither Appellants Nor Appellee But
Supporting Reversal at 4-5, 1-800 Contacts, Inc v. Whenu.com, 414 F.3d 400 (2nd Cir. 2005) (No.
04-0026-cv) 2004 WL 546932 (claiming, in an amicus brief written by Google, the Eastern District of
New York misinterpreted use and the traditional view should be embraced).
97Am. Blind, 2004 WL 2159680, at *5-*6. Google argued that Brookeld and Playboydid "not
directly address the issue of whether the defendant's actions can constitute a Lanham Act 'use'
because both cases essentially bootstrapped the use argument with the separate requirement of the
"likelihood of confusion." Id. at *6.
98 See id. at *11. Google agued GEICO did not apply because in the case GEICO actually
alleged Google used its marks, whereas, in American Blind, American Blind is only arguing the
"likelihood of confusion" element. Id.
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1. Justificationfor TrademarkLaw
Trademark law was created to protect businesses from unfair competition and
dilution of their brand. 99 However, it was not intended to stifle competition in the
free marketplace.1 00 A court must attempt to balance these two conflicting policy
questions in its interpretation of "use in commerce."1 01 The general interpretation of
trademark "use," in a non-internet context, is that the infringing parties "use"
10 2
another party's mark "in connection with the offering of [their] goods and services."
Additionally, the infringing parties are generally required to be a competitor of the
trademark holder.103 Search engine cases seek to expand the definition of "use"
because search engines are not using the "sponsored links" section to advertise their
own services nor are they generally a competitor of the opposing party.1 04 For
example, Google's services as a search engine are not being advertised under the
"sponsored links" section when someone types in "American Blind," but the
companies that purchased the term from Google's AdWords are. Moreover, Google's
role as a search engine is not in competition with a wallpaper and blinds retailer like
American Blind. Nevertheless, there are several reasons for not expanding the
definition of "use," while, conversely, there are several reasons for expanding the
definition.

2. Supportfor a StrietInterpretationof "Use"
A group of scholars against the broad interpretation of "use" believes the

99See Lanham Act § 43, 15 U.S.C. § 1125 (2000). The Lanham Act inherently carves out
circumstances which allow a business remedy for unfair competition. See id. 15 U.S.C. § 1125
covers trademark infringement, dilution, and cybersquatting. Id.
100Colligan v. Activities Club of NY, LTD., 442 F.2d 686, 692 (2nd Cir. 1970) (interpreting the
Lanham Act as protecting unfair competition, but also calling it a "special and limited unfair
competition remedy"); Allied Maint. Corp. v. Allied Mech. Trades, Inc., 42 N.Y.2d 538, 544 (N.Y.
1977) (referring to a dilution statute, the court claimed that the "evil which the Legislature sought
to remedy was not public confusion caused by similar products or services sold by competitors").
Both of these cases illustrate how courts attempt to interpret statutory intent and are examples of
the balancing between the wrongs the Lanham Act attempts to prevent and the encouragement of
competition. See Allied Maint. Corp., 42 N.Y.2d at 544; Co1/fgan, 442 F.2d at 692.
101 See Alled Maint. Carp., 42 N.Y.2d at 544; Co]igan, 442 F.2d at 692.
102 See Doogan & Lemley, supra note 19, at 779 (mentioning that to "face liability under
trademark law, a party had to 'use' a mark as a brand in connection with the offering of goods and
services, usually in direct competition with the trademark holder").
103 See Doogan & Lemley, supra note 19, at 779 (discussing how in the domain name cases
courts had a hard time applying the very liberal concept of initial interest confusion when the
potential infringing party had a dissimilar product or service); DaimlerChrysler AG v. Bloom, 315
F.3d 932, 939 (8th Cir. 1996) (claiming that the trademark holder was not entitled to relief unless
the defendant used the actual mark to cause "the public to see the protected mark and associate the
infringer's goods or services with those of the mark holder").
104 See Brief of Amicus Curiae Google Inc. Supporting Neither Appellants Nor Appellee But
Supporting Reversal at 4-8, 1-800 Contacts, Ine v. Whenu.eom, 414 F.3d 400 (2nd Cir. 2005) (No.
04-0026-cv) 2004 WL 546932 (arguing that the expansive definition of use would not only expand
traditional trademark law, but expand it in a negative fashion).
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expansion threatens informative speech and fair competition. 10 5 This rhetoric
appeared in Ringling Bros.-Barnum & Bailey v. Utah Division of Travel
Development.10 6 Ringling Brother's trademarked term THE GREATEST SHOW ON
EARTH.107 In discussing trademark dilution, the Fourth Circuit stated a "broad
interpretation of statutes would undermine the balance between private and public
108
rights" of traditional trademark protection.
Another case that refused to expand use on similar grounds was Lockheed
Martin v. Network Solutions.10 9 Network Solutions was a domain name registrar. 110
In the course of business, it sold domain names, which contained Lockheed Martin's
famous marks, to domain name purchasers; as a result, Lockheed Martin sued
Network Solutions for trademark infringement. 111 In a decision relying heavily on
policy, the Northern District of Texas determined that allowing Lockheed Martin to
prevail would place Network Solutions in a position to perform "gatekeeper
functions." 112 The Northern District of Texas reasoned that imputing gatekeeper
status on Network Solutions would require Network Solutions to evaluate the
legitimacy of every person registering a domain name. 113 The court concluded that
this would not only be a hard standard for Network Solutions to attain, but it would
create a multitude of problems which, in the Northern District of Texas's view, would

105 See Deogan & Lemley, supira note 19, at 780-82 ("suggesting that Internet intermediaries
have a responsibility to police the content of their advertisers and a duty to avoid the use of marks
as keywords . . . Playboy and its progeny threaten to chill a vast sector of informative speech"); Uli
Widmaier, Use, Liability, and the Structure of Trademark Law, 33 HOFSTRA L. REV. 603, 604
(arguing that "the courts' current tendency to overprotect communicative symbols of all kinds via
trademark law impoverishes human discourse and leads inevitably to collisions with the First
Amendment"). Mark A. Lemley, the co-Author of Trademarkin Transition:Institute for Intellectual
Property& Information Law Symposium.*Trademarks and Consumer Search Costs on the Internet,
was also the representative for Google in the filing of the amicus brief before the Second Circuit in
the 1-800 Contacts, Inc. v. WhenUeom decision. Brief of Amicus Curiae Google Inc. Supporting
Neither Appellants Nor Appellee But Supporting Reversal at 1, 1-800 Contacts, Inc v. Whenu.com,
414 F.3d 400 (2nd Cir. 2005) (No. 04-0026-cv) 2004 WL 546932.
106 See Ringling Bros.-Barnum & Bailey Combined Shows, Inc. v. UT Div. Travel Dev., 170
F.3d 449, 455 (4th Cir. 1999).
107 Id. at 451-52 (4th Cir. 1999) (stating that the cause of action developed when Ringling
Brothers sought "injunctive and monetary relief, on allegations that Utah's use of the 'GREATEST
SNOW' mark 'diluted' Ringling's 'GREATEST SHOW' mark").
108 Id at 455. See Moseley v. Secret Catalogue, 537 U.S. 418, 433 (2003). Although the United
States Supreme Court overturned Ringling Brothers in part, it did agree that "where the marks at
issue are not identical, the mere fact that consumers mentally associate the junior user's mark with
the famous mark is not sufficient to establish actionable dilution." Id
10) Lockheed Martin Corp. v. Network Solutions, Inc., 141 F. Supp. 2d 648, 656 (N.D. Tex.
2001) (concluding that dilution claims are premised on the infringing parties' "use" of plaintiffs
trademark or any attempt to benefit from that mark).
110 Id. at 650.
11 See id. (including these examples: "lockheedmartin.org, lockheedmartin-comsat.com, and
comsat-lockheedmartin.com").
112 Id. at 655. Network Solutions service, as a registrar that kept a registry of domain names,
could not bear the expense and liability of registering trademarked domain names. Id. The court
ultimately seemed unwilling to extend trademark law for fear that it would cripple the domain
name registering industry. Id.
113 Id.,
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make it impossible for Network solutions to function as a registrar. 114 Analogizing
Networking Solutions with Google v. American Blind, AdWords allows people to
purchase search terms, just like Network Solutions allows people to purchase domain
names. 115 Continuing the parallel, Google could argue that extending trademark
liability to AdWords's practice of allowing advertisers to purchase trademarks of
competitors would subject it to gatekeeper functions wrought with liability and
116
economically crippling repercussions.
Google, in its amicus brief in 1-800 Contacts, further pushed policy reasons for
the court not to expand the definition of trademark "use." 11 7 Google argued that its
practice is no different than walking into a drug store to purchase a certain type of
118
drug, and finding the drug store's generic brand next to the name brand product.
In addition to the legal backdrop of the three WhenU cases, which applied the
strict/traditional interpretation of "use," Google used the above policy arguments to
persuade the court to keep the interpretation of "use" strict.1 19

3.Supportfor a Liberal Interpretationof "Use"
On the other hand, the argument for the liberal interpretation of "use" is that
businesses, like American Blind, will be granted trademark remedy against a search
engine for perpetuating the problem.1 20 Supporters of a liberal construction of "use"
separate search engines from traditional trademark analysis. 1 21
At least one
commentator has disagreed directly with the traditional interpretation and attacked
it.122 In an attempt to distinguish Network Solutions, the commentator argued that

Id..
115
Id. at 650.
116See generally William M. Landes & Richard A. Posner, Trademark Law: An Economic
"I

Perspective, 30 J.L. & ECON. 265, 268-70 (1987). Underlying and supporting the policy to create
trademark law is Judge Posner's Law and Economics theory. Id. Posner posits that the lowering of
brand recognition costs to consumers was one of the justifications for trademark law. Td.
117Brief of Amicus Curiae Google Inc. Supporting Neither Appellants Nor Appellee But
Supporting Reversal at 4-5, 1-800 Contacts, Inc v. Whenu.com, 414 F.3d 400 (2nd Cir. 2005) (No.
04-0026-cv) 2004 WL 546932.
118 Id.
There were several analogies submitted to the court by Google. Id. These included:
newspapers being allowed to use "trademarked terms in a headline," magazines being able to sell
"advertising that relates to the content of their special issues," and restaurants and other businesses
buying property close to "an established competitor . . . [and] trading on the attraction the
established company has created." Id.
119 So id.
120 See Givan, supra note 74, at
6. Givan argues search engine use, such as Google's selling
of adware, should be considered "use" in commerce because a liberal interpretation allows courts to
analyze the main point of trademark law: the "likelihood of confusion." Givan, supra note 74, at 6.
However, she ultimately believes search engine actions that pass the "use" requirement will fail
under the "likelihood of confusion" element. Givan, supra note 74, at 6.
121 See Givan, supra note 74, at
6.
122 Givan, supra note 74, at
6. Because a potential liberal reading of "use" is in its infant
stages, there are not many cases that support the policy arguments. See GEICO v. Google, Inc., 330
F. Supp. 2d 700, 704 (E.D. Va. 2004) (mentioning no policy arguments when it found use), Playboy
Enters., Inc. v. Netscape Commc'ns Corp., 354 F.3d 1020, 1024 (9th Cir. 2004) (mentioning that the
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Network Solutions charged the same amount for every registered domain name,
while, Google allows advertisers to bid on AdWords, charging the advertisers
according to the number of times a computer user activates the link. 123 However, the
argument is shaky because it attempts to bootstrap the "likelihood of confusion"
124
element for the "use" element.
The argument for liberal interpretation ultimately reasons that because the
overriding policy of trademark law is to prevent consumer confusion, "the 'use in
commerce' definition should be interpreted flexibly enough so as to prevent that
use." 125

The question begs to be asked is if an act is committed that meets a

requirement of a multipart test, should the rest of that multipart test be interpreted
liberally to ultimately find a wrong has been committed. More importantly, does
Google's practice of "suggesting" an internet user purchase certain AdWords that
contain trademarks go far enough past Network Solutions to the extent that Google
is no longer a "gatekeeper," but an actual participant?

B. Is TrademarkInfringement the ProperCause ofAction in Search Engine Cases?
Trademark owners asserting their rights in both the search engine and pop-up
cases made sure not to put their entire argument into one cause of action. 126 It is not
unusual to see internet related trademark claims grouped under the contributory
form of trademark infringement and the direct and contributory forms of trademark
dilution. 127 Occasionally, attorneys will attempt to use non-trademark causes of
128
action, like the trespass to chattels claim in Sotelo, to grant their client remedy.
The Google court must determine whether trademark infringement is the most viable
and actionable form of remedy in search engine cases.
In U-Haul v. WhenU, U-Haul pleaded trademark dilution along with trademark
infringement. 129 However, proving prima faeie trademark dilution and infringement
commerce clause has traditionally been interpreted liberally). Basically, the Playboy and GEICO
decisions are the only two valid cases directly on point. GEICO, 330 F. Supp. 2d at 703; Playboy,
354 F.3d at 1024. With few cases, and in the face of a long line of legal precedent that interprets
'use" narrowly, Givan distinguishes the historical policy arguments from the current search engine
situation. Givan, supra note 74, at
30-42.
123 See Givan, supra note 74,
42.
121 See Givan, supra note 74,
47. But see Holiday Inns, Inc. v. 800 Reservation, Inc., 86 F.3d
619, 626 (6th Cir. 1996) (refusing to perform an analysis test for the "likelihood of confusion"
because "use," a threshold issue, was not met).
125 Givan, supra note 74,
47; see 1-800 Contacts, Inc. v. WhenU.com, 309 F. Supp. 2d 467,
489 (S.D.N.Y. 2003) (finding that a pop-up advertisement is not only confusing, but also capitalizes
on the goodwill of those who use the product); Playboy, 354 F.3d at 1024 (commenting that the main
goal of trademark is to prevent consumer confusion).
126 See Google v. Am. Blind & Wallpaper Factory, Inc., No. C 03-05340, 2005 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
6228, at *3 (N.D. Cal. Mar. 30, 2005). American Blind threw the proverbial kitchen sink at Google
by not only suing on claims of direct and contributory infringement and dilution actions, but going a
step further and charging tortious interference with a prospective business advantage. Id.
127 Id,
128 Sotelo v. Directrevenue LLC, 384 F. Supp. 2d 1219, 1222 (N.D. Ill. 2005).
129 U-Haul Int'l, Inc. v. WhenU.com, Inc., 279 F. Supp. 2d 723, 729 (E.D. Mich. 2003). The
court stated that the elements of dilution are: 1) the party asserting the action has famous marks, 2)
the offending party makes commercial use of the marks in commerce, 3) the use of those marks
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requires a showing that the trademarks in question are "used in commerce. 130
Because the U-Haul court did not find WhenU "used" U-Haul's marks within the
context of a trademark infringement claim, it could not find that WhenU "used" the
marks to dilute U-Haul's brand. 131 This clarifies that a strict definition of trademark
"use" on an infringement claim would also carry over to the identical requirement in
a dilution claim.
Trying to succeed on the merits of contributory infringement or dilution creates
an additional level of problems. In Inwood Laboratories v. Ives Laboratories,the
United States Supreme Court held that third parties can be liable if they either
intentionally induce trademark infringement or they know or have reason to know
that parties using their services is infringing. 132 This lends credence to an argument
that Google's AdWords suggestions of trademarked terms may make Google rise
above the level of mere registrar, enjoyed by Network Solutions, and impute them
with "gatekeeper" responsibilities and liabilities.
However, courts interpreting contributory infringement or dilution in internet
cases tend to avoid the question altogether and bury it within their direct dilution
and infringement analysis. 133 In Network Solutions, the Northern District of Texas
avoided application of contributory dilution stating "although courts have discussed
contributory dilution, no appellate court or statute has yet established the cause of
action." 134 In Playboy, the Ninth Circuit stated that the determination of Netscape
being directly or contributorily liable "prove[d] to be a tricky question" and avoided
answering the question altogether. 13 5 The fact that Playhoy did not delve into a
discussion of contributory trademark infringement demonstrates how undecided this
area of law is because this is the same court that took a strong liberal stance on the
"use" requirement for direct trademark infringement. 136
Finally, there might be an avenue outside trademark law altogether. 13 7 In
Sotelo, the Northern District of Illinois held that trespass to chattels survived a
motion to dismiss in a pop-up case. 138 The attempted application of trespass to

began after the marks became famous, and 4) the use of the "trademarks dilutes the distinctive
quality of the marks." Id.
130 Id. The second element of the text clearly tracks the language that the offending party
must make "commercial use of the marks in commerce." Id.
131See id. The Eastern District of Michigan found that U-Haul could not show that WhenU
"used" "U-Haul's marks as defined in the Lanham Act." Id. As a result, WhenU was entitled to
summary judgment for the trademark dilution claim. Id.
132 Inwood Labs., Inc. v. Ives Labs., Inc., 456 U.S. 844, 853-54 (1982). See also Warner & Co.
v. Lilly & Co., 265 U.S. 526, 530 (1924). The court analyzed the theory in a manufacture of goods
context. Id. at 530. Inwood relied on Warner & Co. v. Lilly & Co., a case from the 1920's that
predates the Lanham Act, to support its theory on contributory infringement. Inwood Labs., Inc.,
456 U.S. at 854.
133 See Google v. Am. Blind & Wallpaper Factory, Inc., No. C 03-05340-JF, 2005 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 6228, at *33 (N.D. Cal. Mar. 30, 2005).
'31 Lockheed Martin Corp. v. Network Solutions, Inc., 194 F. 3d 980, 986 (9th Cir. 1999).
135 Playboy Enters., Inc. v. Netscape Commc'ns. Corp., 354 F.3d 1020, 1024 (9th Cir. 2004)
(stating, in a very broad manner that under either theory of contributory or direct infringement, the
case may proceed).
1:36Id.

137 See Sotelo v. Directrevenue LLC, 384 F. Supp. 2d 1219, 1233 (N.D. Ill. 2005).
138 Id
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chattels actions on the internet is not new. 139 Most recently, in Intel Corp. v. Hamid
the Supreme Court of California addressed the trespass to chattels theory in relation
to unsolicited email messages. 140 However, even though the court upheld the
possible application of trespass to chattels to an internet context, it ultimately
decided, in a narrow 4-3 decision, that the plaintiff Intel was unable to establish the
142
requisite elements.14 1 Hamidl4 in turn, has created equally divided commentary.
Those in favor of the application of the doctrine praise it, in part, because it creates
remedy in an area with no adequate statutory remedy. 143 In contrast, those opposed
to the application of the doctrine point to the difficulty the Hamidi court had in
applying the doctrine, claiming that adoption of trespass to chattels was an "ill-fated
144
attempt to adapt a traditional tort doctrine to the new legal frontier of cyberspace."
The similarities between commentators lamenting the expansion of the trespass to
chattels doctrine and the "use" element of trademark infringement highlight the
inherent problems of adapting current law to a new medium.
In addition, because the Supreme Court of California found that parties
attempting to succeed on the theory must show that their chattels have actually been
harmed, it would be difficult to argue that there is actual harm in a search engine
scenario. 145 This is because search engines, unlike spyware, are not physically on the
consumer's computer. 146 The reason why trespass to chattels may work in a pop-up
scenario is because there is actual spyware software that affects the aggrieved
147
party's computer.
As the case analysis demonstrates, trying to get around direct infringement by
claiming trademark dilution will be confronted with the same "use" requirement and
those who attempt contributory trademark infringement claims face murky and
unsettled law. 148 Not to mention, it does not get any easier trying to revitalize old
legal concepts, like trespass to chattels, and apply them to present law. 149 Should the

13)

See Mark D. Robins, Electronic Trespass: An Old Theory in a New Context, 15 NO. 7

COMPUTER LAWYER 1, 1 (1998) (discussing trespass to chattels as it relates to the internet in 1998).
140 Intel Corp. v. Hamidi, 71 P.3d 296, 299-300 (Cal. 2003).
141
142

[d. at 296.
Compare Edward W. Chang, Bidding on Trespass:EBA Y Inc. v. Bidder's Edge, Inc. ad the

Abuse of Trespass Theory, 29 AIPLA Q.J. 445, 456 (2001) (finding "supporters of the cyber-trespass
theory point to the void in statutory remedies available to litigants who depend on technology and
internet-based property"), with President & Fellows of Harvard College, 17 HARV. J.L. & TECH. 283,
294 (2003) (arguing that applying trespass to chattels on the internet is "in direct conflict with our
conception of the Internet and electronic communication channels as 'new marketplaces of ideas').
13 Chang, supra note 142, at 456.
144 President & Fellows of Harvard College, supra note 142, at 284.
145 Intel Corp., 71 P.3d at 300.
116 See Sotelo v. Directrevenue LLC, 384 F. Supp. 2d 1219, at 1223 (N.D. Ill. 2005). In Sotelo
the court found that "Spyware is being installed" on consumers' computers because Direct Revenue
"'deceptively caused' Spyware to download without the users' consent or knowledge." Id. at 1223.
147 Id. "DirectRevenue 'secretly installs' Spyware by bundling it with other legitimate software
that is available 'free' on the Internet, such as games." Id.
148
See 1 CHARLES MCKENNEY & GEORGE F. LONG III, FED. UNFAIR COMPETITION: LANHAM
ACT 43(a) § 3:37 (2005) (suggesting that there are two courts that have considered contributory
dilution claims and, though it states the law, it does not state a case that has found an example of
contributory dilution).
149 See President & Fellows of Harvard College, supra note 142, at 284.
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court try to fashion an answer or demand Congress address the situation?

C. Advocating CongressionalAction: A Viable Solution?
It is well known that Congress can be slow in enacting legislation to address a
specific problem. 150 However, in internet-related cases, Congress seems to respond
more quickly. 151 Around the time Brookfield, a domain name case, interpreted initial
interest confusion in a way to grant Brookfield remedy in the late 1990's, the AntiCybersquatting Act was enacted. 152 Not only did this Act remedy the inadequacies of
trademark law by creating a bad faith provision, it created clear remedies and
153
separated domain name disputes from general trademark law.
Sporty's Farm LLC v. Sportsman's Market provides a particularly good
example of how the new legislation remedied the holes in traditional trademark
law. 154 The trademarked term "Sporty's" was used by Sporty's Farm, a Christmas
Tree Farm, as a domain name. 155 In addition, "Sporty's" was used by Sportsman's
Market "to identify its catalogs and products." 156 Under the unamended Lanham
Act, even if there appeared to be bad faith, courts analyzing cases like Sporty's Farm
typically found that even though there was dissimilar service there could not be
confusion. 157 With the new legislation, however, the Second Circuit Sporty's Farm
158
decision found bad faith and a violation of the Anti-Cybersquatting Act.
Pop-Up cases also have pending federal legislation in the Securely Protect
Yourself Against Cyber Trespass Act. 159 Although the laws do not utilize trademark
law, Congress recognizes that there is a unique problem necessitating specific
legislation. 160 Should a similar fate be necessary for search engine cases?

150 See generally Carsten A. Peterson, New Twist to an Old Injustice Genetic Discrimination
and Medicare Reform, 36 IDAHO L. REV. 345, 347 (2000). Peterson argues that Medicare legislation
has for years avoided a comprehensive treatment of genetic discrimination in Medicare. Id. This is
also true in international affairs and civil rights contexts. See generallyMichael J. Bazyler, Survey
of Book: Justie for the Collective: The Limits of the Human Rights ClassActions: Holocaust Justice:
The Battle for Restitution in America's Courts, 102 MICH. L. REV. 1152, 1168 (2004). Bazyler
asserts that Congress did not enact the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act to limit the immunity of
foreign states until 1976. Id. Additionally, it was only much later that the Supreme Court found
the Act could apply retroactively. Id.
151 See generallyUtah Code Ann. § 13-40-101 (2000) (relating to legislation dealing with pop
ups); 15 U.S.C. § 1125(d) (2000) (relating to legislation dealing with domain name cybersquatting).
152 Brookfield Commc'ns, Inc. v. W. Coast Entm't Corp., 174 F.3d 1036, 1057 (9th Cir. 1999); 15

U.S.C. § 1125(d) (2000).
153 15 U.S.C. § 1125(d) (2000).
151 Sporty's Farm LLC v. Sportsman's Mkt, Inc., 202 F.3d 489, 495-96 (2nd Cir. 2000);
Springer, supra note 41, at 344-46 (pointing out that the District Court decided the case before the
legislation and the Second Circuit decided the case using the new legislation).
155 Springer, supra note 41, at 345.
156 Springer, supra note 41, at 345.
157 See Springer, supra note 41, at 346-47.
158 Sporty's Falrm, 202 F.3d at 499; see generally15 U.S.C. § 1125(d) (2000).
159 See gene-rally H.R. REP. NO. 108-619 (2004) (introducing a federal bill called the "Securely

Protect Yourself Against Cyber Trespass Act").
160 See

id.
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III. SOLUTION
This comment proposes specific legislation as a solution to the difficult
trademark questions search engine cases pose. First and foremost, the fact that
Google's AdWords program suggests brand names like "Volvo Tires" and "Goodyear
Tires" when a competitor wants to purchase the term "tires," seems to promote
confusion. However, finding another area of law or attempting to expand the
doctrine of trademark infringement to fix the situation is not the best solution.

A. Can Search Engine Actions FitInto Another Area of Law?
Creative attorneys in Sotelo v. Directrevenue were able to find a potential
remedy in a trespass to chattels theory for pop-up cases. 161 They argued that the
legal concept worked well with pop-up cases because two elements of trespass to
chattels, interference and damage, applied to the internet context. 162 Basically, a
plaintiff could assert that a spyware program interfered with his computer when the
163
plaintiff received the program by downloading completely unrelated software.
Additionally, in arguing damages, Sotelo posited that spyware not only obscured the
computer's monitor, but was also a resource consuming the computer's operating
164
capacity.
These theories and similar ones, such as conversion, do not work for search
engines because personal computers are not being interfered with. For example,
search engine liability for conversion would only work if the person who entered a
search into a search engine brought an action against that search engine for
providing advertising links. This action would not hold up because the search engine
165
is "online" and is not installed on the user's computer.

161 Sotelo v. Directrevenue, LLC, 384 F. Supp. 2d 1219, 1222 (N.D. Ill. 2005). The Northern
District of Illinois admitted that there was little to no case law over the past century addressing the
elements of trespass to chattels. Id. at 1230. However, Sotelo, arguing primarily from treatises and
secondary sources, convinced the court that it was a colorable form of action. See id.
162 Id.. Common law trespass to chattels had three major elements: 1) an intent to posses the
chattel, 2) interference and, 3) the using or intermeddling with that chattel. Restatement (Second)
of Torts § 217 (1965). Directrevenue argued that, assuming trespass to chattels is colorable, Sotelo
did not meet the requirements because he failed to plead causation and damages to his computer.
Sotelo, 384 F. Supp. 2d at 1230. However, the court found Sotelo plead sufficient facts on causation
and damages to withstand Directrevenue's motion to dismiss. Id.
163 See Sotelo, 384 F. Supp. 2d at 1230. Sotelo's causation argument alleged that spyware was
"the proximate cause of significant and cumulative injury to computers." Id.
104 Id.
Sotelo argued that not only does spyware "bombard" a person's computer when he tries
to navigate the internet, but it also "destroys other software" on a person's computer. Id.
165 Compare Id. at 1223 (stating that Directrevenue actually installs its product on the
computer user's computer), with Google v. Am. Blind & Wallpaper Factory, Inc., No. C 03-05340-JF,
2005 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 6228, at *5-*7 (N.D. Cal. Mar. 30, 2005) (mentioning that Google is a search
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Finally, an application of trespass to chattels to internet trademark law has
created a substantial amount of criticism that is similar to the criticism of a liberal
interpretation of "use" in trademark law. 166 It would not be the best option to step
from an unresolved area of the law directly into another. Because of the tremendous
burden in resurrecting old common law concepts to overcome current case law and to
provide a high-tech solution, it would be best to rely on the current trademark law to
gain remedy.

B. Will A LiberalReading of "Use" Work?
Analyzing the facts in GEICO v. Google illuminates why even a liberal reading
of "use" would not be enough to grant companies suing search engines remedy.
GEICO v. Google is the only search engine case that found "use," other than Google v.
American Bind.167 However, this is a scenario in which one door opens, i.e.
trademark "use" is found, and another one is closed, i.e. the formidable burden of
"likelihood of confusion" has to be shown. 168 In GEICO v. Google, GEICO attempted
to prove confusion through a survey. 169 The survey tested two groups of people
searching online. 170 The test group entered "GEICO" into the Google search engine
and received the regular sponsored links of GEICO's competitors. 171 The control
group entered the same term and, instead of GEICO's competitors, received Nike
advertisements. 172
A questionnaire then asked consumers questions regarding whether the
advertising links would cause the consumers to utilize them and whether the
consumers would think the advertising links were GEICO's links. 173 The results
found that 69.5% of the group thought that the sponsored links were "links to
GEICO's site or affiliated with GEICO in some way." 174 The Eastern District of
Virginia, after breaking new ground in a search engine case and finding "use,"
ultimately ruled against GEICO and held that even though the survey's results could
establish a "likelihood of confusion," the survey itself failed to prove there was
175
confusion.

engine but never stating that the search engine actually interfered with the search engine user's
computer).
166See President & Fellows of Harvard College, supra note 142, at 284.
167 GEICO v. Google, Inc., No. 1:04cv507, 2005 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 18642, at *11-*12 (E.D. Va.
Aug. 8, 2005); Am. Blind, 2005 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 6228, at *22.
168See Brookfield Commc'ns, Inc. v. W. Coast Entm't Corp., 174 F.3d 1036, 1053 (9th Cir.
1999) (holding that the two major requirements of trademark infringement are the elements are
"use" and "likelihood of confusion").
169GEICO, 2005 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 18642, at *17.
170 Id.
171

Id.

172
Id.
73
1 Id. at *18- 19
174 Id. at *19. Additionally, the survey found that approximately twenty percent of the test
group stated that they believed in order to purchase GEICO insurance, they needed to activate one
of the "sponsored links." Id. at *20.
175 See id. at *24-*26. The GEICO court never mentioned what it would believe is the
percentage necessary to create a likelihood of confusion. Id.
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Therefore, Google's selling of keywords to direct competitors may be a trademark
"use," but it does not cause confusion as to Google's practice. This puts Google in a
powerful position because Google can easily analogize its situation with the domain
name registrar cases in which the domain name registrar was not responsible for
selling the trademarked domain names to cybersquatters. 176 It also does not bode
well for plaintiffs attorneys considering trademark infringement because not only do
they need to get a court to liberally construe "use," which has only been done in
GEICO and American Blind, but they also must get the court to find a likelihood of
177
confusion, a feat yet to be accomplished in the search engine scenario.

C Congressionallegislation:A Viable Solution?

A major criticism of proposing legislation is it usually takes a long time to enact,
if at all, and during that time many parties are injured.178 However, Congress has
17 9
shown a willingness to address internet related property questions rather quickly.
For example, the internet was in its beginning stages when Congress passed the
Anti-Cybersquatting Act on November 29, 1999.180 Furthermore, Utah enacted
spyware legislation less than two years from the decision of 1-800 Contacts v. When U
and, in addition, there is currently similar legislation proposed in the Federal
18 1
Government.
The question becomes: what should search engine legislation look like? Utah's
Spyware Control Act ("SCA") has useful statutory language that can be used in a
search engine context. 18 2 It requires that spyware cannot present a product
"displayed in response to a specific mark" or that otherwise "constitutes infringement

176 See Lockheed Martin Corp. v. Network Solutions, Inc., 141 F. Supp. 2d 648, 655 (N.D. Tex.
2001) (concluding that Network Solutions, as a domain name registrar, was not liable for selling
trademarked domain names). But see Givan, supra note 74,
42. Givan argues that Network
Solutions and Amerionn Blind can be distinguished. Givan, suprn note 74, 42. Network Solutions
charged only a flat fee for every domain name; whereas, Google's AdWords campaign charges higher
prices based on popularity of the term and how much advertisers want their link to show up first
under the sponsored links. Givan, supra note 74,
42. In a sense, the fluctuation prices caused
Google to be more of an active participant than a passive registrar like Network Solutions. Givan,
supra note 74, 42.
177 Compare 1-800 Contacts, Inc v. Whenu.com, 309 F. Supp. 2d 467, 489 (S.D.N.Y. 2003)
(finding use in a pop-up case), with 1-800 Contacts, Inc v. Whenu.com, 414 F.3d 400, 408 (2nd Cir.
2005) (overruling the Southern District of New York's finding of use). The Southern District of New
York's liberal construction of "use" was one of the "uncertain" states of law that the American Blind
court relied on to deny Google's motion to dismiss. See Google Inc., v. Am. Blind & Wallpaper
Factory, No. C 03-05340, 2005 WL 832398, *5 (N.D. Cal. Mar. 30, 2005).
178 Peterson, supra note 150, at 347; Bazyler, supra note 150, at 1168.
179See generally Securely Protect Yourself Against Cyber Trespass Act, H.R. 2929, 109th
Cong. (2005); UTAH CODE ANN. § 13-40-101 (2000).
180 Compare Intermatic Inc. v. Toeppen, 947 F. Supp. 1227, 1229 (N.D. Ill. 1996) (proclaiming
"[w]elcome to cyberspace!"), with 15 U.S.C. §1125(d) (2000).
181 See gene]rally Securely Protect Yourself Against Cyber Trespass Act, H.R. 2929; UTAH CODE
ANN. § 13-40-101.
182 See generallyUTAH CODE ANN. § 13-40-201(1) (2000).
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of a registered trademark under federal or state law."1 8 3 This would take care of the
1-800 Contacts problem with WhenU's software recognizing its mark and triggering
competitor's pop-ups because, under the Act, the WhenU software would be
considered "spyware" that is displayed in response to the trademark 1-800
CONTACTS.184 What is so appealing about Utah's legislation is it leaves room for
trademark protection while, at the same time, not leaning on trademark principles
too heavily.
The same holds true in the Google scenario. If Google is not allowed to use
trademarks as suggested AdWords terms for purchase, much of the litigation would
cease. Alternatively, under the Utah statute, Google would be in violation of the
legislation if its actions constituted trademark infringement.1 8 5
This allows
traditional trademark law the potential to grow, but it does not force courts to strive
to liberalize the law to grant remedy in search engine disputes.

IV. CONCLUSION
Trademark law, as currently defined, is being challenged by the new search
engine cases. Just like domain name and pop-up disputes before it, plaintiffs are
asking courts to grant them remedies based on liberal readings of trademark
requirements.1 8 6 There is a fine line, however, between stretching a doctrine to
remedy a perceived wrong and having that doctrine, and the law behind it, snapped
when trying to stretch it too far. It is in these instances legislation is necessary
because it will keep traditional trademark requirements intact, while providing an
avenue of justice for injured parties.
Legislation as a solution becomes even more appealing when Congressional
response to online trademark disputes is considered. The domain name cases were
tough on courts because, though it seemed that people would purchase domain names
in bad faith, it was not easy to prove trademark infringement.18 7 Congress responded
quickly with legislation, providing an amendment to the Lanham Act that kept
traditional trademark law intact, while specifically addressing domain name
188
trademark issues.

Id. § 13-40-201(1)(a)-(b).
See id. But see Securely Protect Yourself Against Cyber Trespass Act, H.R. 2929. The
legislation focuses most of its attention on the notice to be received when a user is going to download
a program that contains spyware. Id. § 3. For example, in the proposed legislation, the notice must
contain such direct information as "[t]his program will collect and transmit data about you. Do you
accept?" Id. § 2(c)(1)(B)(i). Essentially, it seems to be no different from contracts clauses that must
183

184

be conspicuous, such as a disclaimer of warranties. UCC, § 2-316(2) (2000).
185 See Doogan & Lemley, supra note 19, at 809-10 (arguing that "use" should not be liberally
construed, yet the door should be left open for a liberal interpretation of use).
186 See Google v. Am. Blind & Wallpaper Factory, Inc., No. C 03-05340-JF, 2005 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 6228, at "11-'12 (N.D. Cal. Mar. 30, 2005); GEICO v. Google, Inc., No. 1:04cv507, 2005 U.S.
Dist. LEXIS 18642, at *11 (E.D. Va. Aug. 8, 2005).
187 See Springer, supra note 41, at 341-43 (stating the most significant effect of the Anticybersquatting Act is the creation of the bad faith provision as well as an attempt to solve
jurisdictional problems in civil procedure).
188 See generally15 U.S.C. § 1125(d) (2000).
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Pop-up cases seem to be headed towards a similar fate. Courts may no longer
have to stretch old common law causes of action, such as trespass to chattels, to
reach a solution.1 8 9 With the current Utah legislation and the pending Federal
Legislation, which passed the House with an overwhelming majority vote, Congress
has made it clear that it is committed to creating legislation concerning internet
property rights. 190
Google's practice of allowing competitors to bid on trademarked terms so their
name is displayed under "sponsored links" on Google's website does not incur the ire
of consumers as much as a barrage of annoying pop-up windows. However, domain
name disputes did not cause a large amount of consumer complaints either, and yet
these were the first situations to garner trademark legislation. What is important is
that legislation will provide a remedy against search engines, while maintaining the
balance of trademark law as a whole.

189

Sotelo v. Directrevenue, LLC, 384 F. Supp. 2d 1219, 1231-33 (N.D. Ill. 2005).

190 See genera-ly Securely Protect Yourself Against Cyber Trespass Act, H.R. 2929, 109th

Cong. (2005).

